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Abstract: This essay demonstrates the inadequacy of contemporary substantivalist and 
relationist interpretations of quantum gravity hypotheses via an historical investigation of 
the debate on the underlying ontology of space in the seventeenth century. Viewed in the 
proper context, there are crucial similarities between seventeenth century theories of 
space and contemporary work on the ontological foundations of spacetime theories, and 
these similarities challenge the utility of the substantival/relational dichotomy by 




1. Introduction.  
Even given the most basic and clear-cut conception of substantivalism and 
relationism—where the substantivalist holds, and the relationist rejects, that 
space/spacetime is an independently existing entity—it has become quite evident that the 
attempts to ascribe either a substantivalist or relationist interpretation to classical 
gravitation theories is an exercise fraught with perils, since that the sophisticated forms of 
both ontologies are seemingly identical as regards their content in the modern setting of 
general relativity.1 What is less well-known, however, is that this metaphysical quagmire 
has likewise ensnarled philosophers concerned with the ontology of quantum gravity 
(QG), which will, it is hoped, link the physics at the spatiotemporal micro-realm of 
quantum mechanics (QM) with the large-scale structure of space and time in general 
relativity (GR). In short, the general consensus would seem to be that sophisticated 
versions of both substantivalism and relationism are equally consistent, or equally 
problematic, interpretations of QG (e.g., Rickles 2005, Earman 2006), a conclusion that is 
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apparently reflected in the rival appropriations of an important QG hypothesis, Loop 
Quantum Gravity (LQG), for either Leibnizian relationism or Newtonian susbtantivalism. 
For example, a Leibnizian lineage for LQG has been put forward by Smolin (2000, 119-
120; 2006, 200-203), among many others. Yet, in Dainton (2010), which defends the 
relevance of the substantival/relational dichotomy in GR (380-381), it is argued that the 
ontology of LQG “seems as substantival as any conception”, prompting Dainton to ask, 
“What could be less Leibnizian?”, despite the fact that LQG is “very different from 
Newton’s absolute space” (405-406). In short, why does the substantival/relational 
dichotomy lead to such conflicting assessments? Since this is one the most basic and 
important ontological divisions in the philosophy of space and time, it is imperative to 
investigate what has gone wrong, and to examine if there are better alternatives.   
This essay will explore this philosophical quandary, and offer an alternative range of 
conceptual distinctions that lie below the rather imprecise and obscure dichotomy 
imposed by contemporary substantivalism and relationism. In particular, an examination 
of a range of seventeenth century metaphysical speculation on the deep ontology of 
space, e.g., by Gassendi, More, Newton, Leibniz, and others, will reveal a host of 
uncanny similarities with the modern QG program. As will be demonstrated, these 
similarities concern (i) the nature, and possible dissimilarity, of the spatial geometry at 
the fundamental level of ontology and at the macroscopic level of matter or fields, and 
(ii) unique forms of both platonism and nominalism as regards the status of spatial 
geometry. It is with respect to these two issues that both the seventeenth century and the 
contemporary QG debates are concerned; and, importantly, these two issues lie athwart 
the equivocality of the substantivalist/relationist division. Indeed, since these new sets of 
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issues and distinctions are not congruent with the substantival/relational dichotomy, the 
conclusions of this essay can be interpreted as undermining the relevance of that 
dichotomy for space (spacetime) theories, although a fairly trivial version of the 
dichotomy, parasitic on the platonism/nominalism distinction, can still be invoked, as will 
be explained. The results of our investigation will also challenge those who consider the 
contemporary division between a background independent/dependent formulation of a 
theory’s spacetime geometry, which is a central theme in the search for QG, as the 
modern equivalent of the substantival/relational divide. The conclusions reached in this 
essay might strike the reader as controversial; but, on both historical and philosophical 
grounds, it will be argued that the inadequacies of the substantival/relational distinction, 
especially as regards the deep ontology of space, merit its overthrow.  
In sections 2, 3, and 4, various similarities and differences between Newton, Leibniz, 
and other seventeenth century thinkers, will be surveyed, with the lessons gathered from 
our analysis applied, in section 5, to the strategies proposed among competing QG 
hypotheses and to various QG issues, such as background independence and nominalism.  
 
2. The Ontological Foundation of Space in The Seventeenth Century. 
If anything is disclosed in the competing ontological interpretations of Smolin and 
Dainton, recounted above, it has little to do with the adequacy of the 
substantival/relational dichotomy. Rather, it exposes the enduring aspiration among 
latter-day thinkers to appropriate Newton (a presumed substantivalist) and Leibniz (a 
presumed relationist) as the proper historical ancestor of a particular modern theory of 
spacetime, such that a clear line of descent can be established. Yet, the actual details of 
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the spatial hypotheses of seventeenth century natural philosophers undermine such 
attempts, as we will now begin to explore. In this section, the emphasis will be placed on 
Newton and Leibniz, as the alleged historical representatives of, respectively, 
substantivalism and relationism. 
One of the concessions that can be made to the traditional substantival/relational 
dichotomy should be admitted at this point, however. Newton does, and Leibniz does not, 
allow the possibility of the existence of spatial geometry in a completely void space. We 
will dub these respective hypotheses: “trivial substantivalism”, that space can exist absent 
of matter; and “trivial relationism”, that space cannot exist absent of matter. As the 
adjective ‘trivial’ suggests, this distinction is not very informative, since, as will be 
argued in later sections, it fails to address the deeper issue that forms the basis of this 
distinction, namely, Newton’s platonism and Leibniz’ nominalism as regards spatial 
geometry. 
2.1. Newton. Put briefly, if substantivalism is “the postulation of the independent 
reality of space as a kind of substance” (Sklar 1974, 161), then there were likely very few 
substantivalists prior to the modern substantival/relational debate. Newton’s De 
gravitatione, following Gassendi, Charleton and numerous other thinkers back to at least 
Patrizi, insists that space “has its own manner of existing which is proper to it and which 
fits neither substance nor accident”: space is not a substance because it cannot “act upon 
things, yet everyone tacitly understands this of substance” (Newton 2004, 21), nor is it an 
accident (property), “since we can clearly conceive extension existing without any 
subject, as when we imagine spaces outside the world or places empty of any body 
whatsoever, . . .” (21-22). While this last passage clearly denies that space is an accident 
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of body, it leaves open the possibility that space could be related to God’s existence in a 
property-like fashion. In fact, space does seem to require a “subject” given his famous 
“emanation” claims, which imply that space (somehow) follows from God’s existence: 
“[space] is as it were an emanative effect of God and an affection of every kind of being” 
(21); and, “space is eternal in duration and immutable in nature because it is the 
emanative effect of an eternal and immutable being” (26). The resolution of this puzzle 
resides in the fact that Newton rejects the “inherence” conception commonly associated 
with accidents: after admitting that space is a form of “substantial reality”, he adds that it 
does “not need to be inherent in a subject” (32). Unlike More, who did posit space as a 
property inherent in God in his later Enchiridium (More 1995, 56-57), Newton 
consistently conceives space as a sort of quasi-property that depends upon God, sans 
inherence, of course: for instance, he claims that God contains “all other substances in 
Him as their underlying principle and place”, and he rejects the possibility “that a dwarf-
god should fill only a tiny part of infinite space with this visible world created by him” 
(Newton 1978, 123).  
2.2. Leibniz. If substantivalism is not a particularly accurate depiction of Newton’s 
deep ontology of space, relationism is an equally unfortunate characterization of Leibniz’ 
underlying spatial ontology. The modern relationist conception posits material 
bodies/events as the basis for the relations that constitute space, such that the metric 
(distance) and overall geometry of space is dependent on, and can be reduced to, material 
bodies/events (and where unextended point masses/events could serve as this reductivist 
basis; see, e.g., Sklar 1974, 167; Friedman 1983, 217). Overall, there are many 
relationist-like aspects to Leibniz’ conception, in particular, his acceptance of trivial 
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relationism: “that there is no space where there is no matter and that space in itself is not 
an absolute reality” (2000, L.V.62). Following Newton, Leibniz reckons that space 
cannot act upon things (NE:II.xiii.17), but, also like Newton, space does not inhere in 
individual beings in the traditional Scholastic accident sense (L.V.47). In accordance with 
the substance/accident metaphysics, he insists that there can be no ontologically 
unsupported spatial properties: “Now extension must be the affection of something 
extended. But if that space is empty, it will be an attribute without a subject, an extension 
without anything extended” (L.IV.9). Yet, even granting that extension is an individual 
bodily property that cannot transfer from one substance to another, Leibniz does not rule 
out the possibility that the world’s extension, which corresponds to his idealized notion 
“space”, could still function as something like a unique holistic property of the entire 
material world.  
This last suggestion is, in fact, supported in a work on the principle of the identity of 
the indiscernibles, where Leibniz claims that “there are no purely extrinsic denominations 
[i.e., purely spatial differences], because of the interconnection of things”, and, “if place 
does not itself make a change [i.e., no extrinsic denominations], it follows that there can 
be no change which is merely local” (MP 133, emphasis added; see, also, NE:II.xxv.5). 
This global, or holistic, basis for space is linked to the dynamical interconnections among 
all bodies, an hypothesis that, therefore, can be seen as upholding a unique form of spatial 
or geometric nominalism (see sections 3 and 4 for more on Leibniz’ nominalism):  
In general, place, position and quantity, such as number and proportion, are merely 
relations, and result from other things which by themselves either constitute or 
terminate a change. To be in a place seems, abstractly at any rate, to imply nothing 
but position. But in actuality, that which has a place must express place in itself; so 
that distance and the degree of distance involves also a degree of expressing in the 
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thing itself a remote thing, either of affecting it or receiving an affection from it. So, 
in fact, situation really involves a degree of expressions (MP 133; emphasis added). 
  
The specific details of Leibniz’ account are beyond the scope of this essay (see, Slowik 
2009, 2011), but one should first resist the temptation to interpret “expression” as 
denoting a purely phenomenal relationship, in the perceptual, mind-based sense.2 Leibniz 
offers many non-perceptual examples of expression (e.g., linear projections/solids, 
models/machines), which suggest something like the modern notion of a partial 
isomorphism: “What is common to all these expressions is that we can pass from a 
consideration of the relations in the expression to a knowledge of the corresponding 
properties of the thing expressed” (L 207). Accordingly, “expression” indicates a 
structural relationship between any two things (i.e., it is not just between perceptions and 
the material world), and so Leibniz’ idea would seem to be that each body/substance, 
taken “in itself”, expresses distance relations to “remote things” via dynamic change, 
“affecting it or receiving an affection from it”. At a deeper level, however, the world’s 
dynamical interconnections implicate the monadic realm, “things which by themselves 
either constitute or terminate a change”. In particular, Leibniz’ account of extension, and 
its idealization, space, is grounded in an internal quality of constitutive simple 
substances, monads, such that bodily extension “results from” monadic intrinsic 
properties. Leibniz goes on to argue that extended quantity and position “are mere results, 
which do not constitute any intrinsic denominations per se, and so they are merely 
relations which demand a foundation derived from the category of quality [i.e., the action 
or primitive force of monads], that is, from an intrinsic accidental denomination” (MP 
133-134). To sum up, Leibnizian space may be a property-like feature of the entire 
material world, a point raised in his criticisms of Clarke: “Thus, by making space a 
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property, the author falls in with my opinion, which makes it an order of things and not 
anything absolute” (L.IV.9).3 
Yet, like all of the other seventeenth century thinkers, God plays a foundational role 
in Leibniz’ deep ontology of space. In the New Essays, he states that space’s “truth and 
reality are grounded in God, like all eternal truths”, and that “space is an order [of 
situations] but that God is the source” (NE:II.xiii.17). At greater length, he follows 
Descartes by positing that only God’s operations can be assigned a spatial location, a 
view also known in as the “extension of power” doctrine: 
Where space is in question, we must attribute immensity to God, and this also gives 
parts and order to his immediate operations. He is the source of possibilities and of 
existents alike, the one by his essence and the other by his will. So that space like 
time derives its reality only from him, and he can fill up the void whenever he 
pleases. It is in this way that he is omnipresent. (NE:II.xv.2) 
 
To summarize, space (and time) obtain their “reality only from [God]”, and God’s 
“essence” is responsible for the possibility of any existing thing in space (more on this in 
section 3), such that his will can fill up any void. Relations receive a similar treatment: 
“relations and orderings are to some extent ‘beings of reason’, although they have their 
foundations in things; for one can say that their reality, like that of eternal truths and of 
possibilities, comes from the Supreme Reason” (NE:II.xxv.1). Finally, as regards the 
basic constituents of Leibniz’ world, monads, God plays a similar foundational role: “a 
monad, like a soul, is, as it were, a certain world of its own, having no connections of 
dependency except with God” (AG 199). Nevertheless, as mentioned above, the 
interconnections of the world also implicate monadic order: “since each body acts on 
every other body, more or less, in proportion to its distance, . . . it follows that each 
 9 
monad is a living mirror . . . endowed with internal action, which represents the world 
from its own point of view and is ordered as the universe itself” (AG 207). 
At this juncture, Newton’s absolute conception of space is likely to be contrasted with 
the alleged relational character of Leibniz’ hypotheses, and by this means the 
substantivalist and relationist will insist on the utility of their dichotomy. Nevertheless, 
the analysis of place in the New Essays casts serious doubt on any difference between 
Newton and Leibniz that centers upon space’s function: 
‘Place’ is either particular, as considered in relation to this or that body, or universal; 
the latter is related to everything, and in terms of it all changes of every body 
whatsoever are taken into account. If there were nothing fixed in the universe, the 
place of each thing would still be determined by reasoning, if there were a means of 
keeping a record of all the changes or if the memory of a created being were adequate 
to retain them . . . . However, what we cannot grasp is nevertheless determinate in the 
truth of things. (NE:II.xiii.8) 
 
In the preceding discussion, Philalethes, Locke’s spokesman, contends that “same place” 
is relative to different material frameworks: “The chess-board, we also say, is in the same 
place . . . if it remains in the same part of the cabin, though, perhaps, the ship which it is 
in [has set sail] . . .” (NE:II.xiii.8). However, Leibniz rejects this body-based relational 
conception, which he refers to as “particular” place (“in relation to this or that body”), 
and offers his “universal” notion of place instead, such that it “is related to everything, 
and in terms of it all changes of every body whatsoever are taken into account”. Leibniz’ 
claim that “if there were nothing fixed in the universe, the place of each thing would still 
be determined by reasoning” thus mimics Newton’s absolutism in the Principia (Newton 
2004, 66). A modern relationist, on the other hand, must describe “same place” with 
respect to a material reference frame: they cannot, as does Leibniz, countenance the 
possibility that there may be no fixed material frames at all, yet insist that the same place 
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is still “determinate in the truth of things”—determinate with respect to what? Leibniz’ 
claim, consequently, suggests that there is something else besides material existents, his 
universal place, that measures all changes of bodily place. Of course, Leibniz would deny 
that universal place is an independent entity that can exist apart from matter; rather, it is 
simply an internal feature of some sort in bodies/monads that, most likely, allows a 
reconstruction of the prior places that all bodies had occupied. Nonetheless, this 
conclusion still runs counter to relationist dogma, for any record of a universal place 
within matter is analogous to, or functions like, absolute place—although it is absolute 
space reinterpreted as an internal feature of each body/monad. Finally, there are 
relationist objection that can be raised that concern the so-called static and kinematic 
“shift” arguments in the Leibniz-Clarke correspondence, although we will postpone this 
discussion to section 4. Relational motion is a different topic, furthermore, which is 
beyond the bounds of this essay, but it does not effect the deep ontology of space (but, 
see endnote 12). 
2.3. Preliminary Conclusions. As revealed above, both Newton and Leibniz regard 
extension/space as requiring some form of foundation in a substance or entity, broadly 
construed, and this strongly suggests that space functions, in an ontological sense, as 
some sort of property. It may not be a property that is internal to, or inheres in, God for 
Newton and Leibniz, but they both claim that space is dependent on God;4 and Leibniz, 
additionally, views space much like a holistic property of the entire world’s dynamical 
interconnections, ultimately grounded at the monadic level. In short, both reject the 
notion that space is either an independent entity in its own right or that it can act upon 
things, thus it is not a substance. And, since both adhere to the Aristotelian 
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substance/property doctrine, any relationist construal of space as the extension between 
bodies would be reckoned “an attribute without a subject, an extension without anything 
extended” (L.IV.9), and thus outright rejected. It is in this sense that the modern attempts 
to appropriate Newton and Leibniz as would-be substantivalists or relationists (e.g., Sklar 
1974, Friedman 1983, etc.) go seriously awry. The modern substantival/relational debate, 
in contrast, is the likely outgrowth of the rise of the late nineteenth century’s inertial 
frame concept and an accompanying (positivist-influenced) disinterest in archaic non-
empirical, metaphysical, and theological approaches to physics—in brief, the 
contemporary stalemate that afflicts the modern spacetime ontology debate is largely the 
result of this vain effort to fit the seventeenth century’s square metaphysics peg into the 
contemporary scene’s round physics hole; that is, the modern dichotomy strives to remain 
consistent to Newton and Leibniz but without utilizing their stock of metaphysical 
presuppositions. 
Given the recent emphasis on the dual role of g as both the metric and gravitational 
field in GR, the prospects for the modern spacetime ontology debate have faded even 
further, since the competing claims of g as either the unique spacetime substance or just 
another physical field are, it would appear, in principle irresolvable or conventional; i.e., 
there is no longer any relationist unsupported extension between matter if g is a physical 
field—it is “internal” on both relationist and substantivalist construals of GR. The 
common refrain that the postulated entities in QG, whether strings, quantum loops, etc., 
can support either substantivalism or relationism is, therefore, merely the subatomic 
analogue of this fruitless quarrel over the ontological status of such macroscopic “things” 
as the metric/gravitational field.5 
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3. Classifying Spatial Ontology in the Seventeenth Century.  
3.1. Geometric Levels and Platonism/Nominalism. In order to more accurately 
pinpoint the differences between Newton, Leibniz and others in the seventeenth century  
concerning the deep ontological foundations of space, it is necessary to focus on two of 
the main issues in contention: the geometric properties at the various levels of spatial 
ontology, and the whether those geometric properties support platonism or nominalism.  
The first question concerns the similarity or difference in the types of geometry 
posited at the foundational level of the entity/entities that ground space’s existence, 
and/or from which space emerges: we will dub this distinction, ‘FLG’, for foundational 
level geometry. In the seventeenth century, the geometry of space, i.e., the geometry at 
the macrolevel of material bodies, is Euclidean,6 but the nature of the geometric features 
at the foundational level, i.e., God and Leibniz’ monads, could take different forms. 
Leibniz’ New Essays puts forth three ways that a being can be related to the macrolevel 
of place/space, a three-part division that will be of much service in our subsequent 
analysis: 
The Scholastics have three sorts of ubeity, or ways of being somewhere. The first 
is called circumscriptive. It is attributed to bodies in space which are in it point for 
point, so that measuring them depends on being able to specify points in the located 
thing corresponding to points in space. The second is the definitive. In this case, one 
can “define”—i.e. determine—that the located thing lies within a given space without 
being able to specify exact points or places which it occupies exclusively. That is how 
some people have thought that the soul is in the body, because they have not thought 
it possible to specify an exact point such that the soul or something pertaining to it is 
there and at no other point. . . . The third kind of ubeity is repletive. God is said to 
have it, because he fills the entire universe in a more perfect way than minds fill 
bodies, for he operates immediately on all created things, continually producing them, 




In what follows, we will explore how these three types of ubeity relate to the spatial 
geometry at the macrolevel. 
As for circumscriptive ubeity, Leibniz mentions only bodies (whereas Newton and 
More would include all beings), but the idea is that the entity is mapped to three-
dimensional Euclidean space in a point by point manner, much like the modern notion of 
an isomorphism. Leibniz’ analysis also assumes that the entity (whether a body, God, 
etc.) fully shares in the geometric properties intrinsic to macrolevel space, the most 
important of these properties being the metric (distance), as Leibniz specifically 
mentions: “measuring them depends on being able to specify points in the located thing 
corresponding to points in space”. The second way that a being can be related to space is 
“definitive”, wherein “the located thing lies within a given space without being able to 
specify exact points or places which it occupies exclusively”. Unlike the metrical 
structure implicit in circumscriptive ubeity, which also incorporates the topology of 
space, definitive ubeity is a topological conception alone, for the length or extension of 
the entity is indeterminate, i.e., it is not “possible to specify an exact point such that the 
soul or something pertaining to it is there and at no other point”. More carefully, if an 
entity obtains a Euclidean metrical determination, then an exact set of continuously 
structured spatial points needs to be specified for that entity, but, since Leibniz states that 
the exact points cannot be determined, the continuously extended regions needed for 
Euclidean metrical space cannot be applied to that entity. Hence, because the being’s 
spatial properties are limited to individual points alone within a certain region of space, 
all that definitive ubeity can furnish is something akin to the topological notion of a 
neighborhood (which is non-metrical).7 As will be discussed in later sections, a notion 
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that is closely aligned with definitive ubeity, especially as regards its topological 
emphasis, is “holenmerism”, the thesis that a being is whole in every part of space, 
namely, the points of space. Finally, there is “repletive” ubeity, which Leibniz assigns to 
God, and who “operates immediately on all created things, continually producing them, 
whereas finite minds cannot immediately influence or operate upon them”. Although it is 
not mentioned in this passage, Leibniz rejects the notion that God’s being is situated in 
space (see section 2.2 and 3.4), rather, only God’s actions can be situated. So, leaving 
aside the effects of God actions, repletive ubeity equates with the absence of all 
macrolevel geometric properties as regards the being itself. Repletive ubeity will also be 
true for Leibniz’ monads, as will be discussed below.  
Returning to geometry of the foundational entity, FGL, the three types of ubeity 
presented in Leibniz’ discussion—circumscriptive, definitive, and repletive—therefore 
correlate with, respectively, three types of geometrical properties; metrical, topological, 
and pregeometric. “Pregeometric”, in its most general sense, will signify either the 
absence of geometrical properties or the possession of geometrical properties that differ 
significantly from the geometric properties at the macrolevel of space. The macrolevel of 
space, furthermore, is either the Euclidean space of the seventeenth century theorists, or, 
for modern QG theories, the geometry at the higher spatial levels assumed in QM or GR. 
In what follows, we will dub these three positions, in their order of presentation; 
FGL(met), FGL(top), FGL(prg). Accordingly, in the seventeenth century: circumscriptive 
ubeity, FGL(met), holds that the spatial properties of the foundational entity are identical 
with Euclidean space; definitive ubeity, FGL(top), contends that the foundational entity 
only possesses the topological properties of Euclidean space; and repletive ubeity, 
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FGL(prg), is the thesis that the foundational entity is either non-spatial or manifests 
unique spatial properties not found at the macrolevel of Euclidean space. 
The second general issue addresses whether spatial geometry at the macrolevel of 
matter or physical fields, is platonist or nominalist, a distinction that we will dub 
‘ML(plt)’, for macrolevel geometric platonism, and ‘ML(nom)’, for macrolevel 
geometric nominalism. While the interpretation of platonism and nominalism is quite 
variable and complex, our use of the distinction will center on whether geometry at the 
macrolevel exists either independently of all material or physical instantiations, ML(plt), 
or the geometry at the macrolevel only exists as long as matter or a physical field 
instantiates those geometric structures, ML(nom). How platonism and nominalism apply 
to the geometry, if any, at the foundational level of ontology, i.e., FL(plt) and FL(nom), 
will be postponed until section 5.3.  
Employing these definitions, we can now present the real issues that separate Newton, 
Leibniz, and other seventeenth century natural philosophers on the ontological 
foundations of space. In contrast to the substantivalist/relationist dichotomy, these new 
conceptual distinctions will also allow a more accurate assessment of the true lineage of 
these seventeenth century theories among the competing contemporary QG theories, as 
will be presented in section 5.  
3.2. Newton on Spatial Ontology. Newton’s hypotheses of space favor a similarity of 
geometric structure at both the bodily scale and for God, who directly provides the 
foundation of space; and he sides with a platonic realism about spatial geometry: 
FGL(met), and ML(plt). In the De grav, he states: “For the delineation of any material 
figure is not a new production of that figure with respect to space, but only a corporeal 
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representation of it, so that what was formerly insensible in space now appears before the 
senses. . .” (Newton 2004, 22). Such sentiments attest to a platonism concerning 
geometry, needless to say, but not independently of God, as noted in section 2.1. As 
regards geometry at the different levels, both foundational (God) and body, Newton holds 
that there is only one geometry for all beings, even God, and so it is the same at both 
levels. We have already examined some of the statements that confirm this position; e.g., 
God contains “all other substances in Him as their underlying principle and place” 
(Newton 1978, 132). Yet, the best evidence is presented in the De grav, where the 
“determined quantities of extension” thesis is put forward. In brief, Newton presents an 
hypothesis of body that denies the existence of corporeal substance, and is such that God 
directly grounds bodily properties, including extension, rather than corporeal substance: 
“extension takes the place of the substantial subject in which the form of the body [i.e., 
the determined quantities] is conserved by the divine will” (Newton 2004, 29). The 
rationale for this Spinoza-like view is theological, at least to some degree, “[f]or we 
cannot posit bodies of this kind without at the same time positing that God exists, and has 
created bodies in empty space out of nothing . . .” (31). He rejects earlier views of 
substance, especially Descartes’ dualism, by reasoning that “if the distinction of 
substances between thinking and extended is legitimate and complete, God does not 
eminently contain extension within himself”, and, “hence it is not surprising that atheists 
arise ascribing to corporeal substance that [i.e., extension] which solely belongs to the 
divine” (31-32). Accordingly, if there is no difference between corporeal and incorporeal 
substance, since God is the only true substance, then there is only one attribute of 
extension, i.e., God’s extension—hence God’s extension is the same as bodily extension, 
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or FGL(met). Finally, it should be noted that Henry More is the main advocate of 
FGL(met) and ML(plt) in seventeenth century England, and has close similarities with 
Newton’s approach (see, More 1995, 56-57; Slowik 2008). 
3.3. Gassendi on Spatial Ontology. Unlike many of his contemporaries and 
predecessors, Newton and More deny “holenmerism”, a doctrine that does admit a 
difference in geometric properties with regard to various incorporeal and corporeal 
substances. On holenmerism, incorporeal beings are “whole in every part”, which thereby 
allays any concerns about their actual or metaphysical divisibility.8 Gassendi accepts this 
holenmerist view of God, which is equivalent to FGL(top), by declaring:  
[W]e conceive an infinity as if of extension, which we call [God’s] immensity, by 
which we hold that he is everywhere. But, I say as if of extension, lest we imagine 
that the divine substance were extended through space like bodies are. Indeed, 
although the divine substance is supremely indivisible and whole at any time and any 
place, yet doubtless as corporeal substance is said to be extended—that is not at one 
point only but is spread out through many parts of space—so there is a kind of divine 
extension, which does not exist in one place only, but in many, indeed, in all places. 
(1976, 94)  
 
On Gassendi’s estimation, bodies occupy space by being extended (“spread out”) across 
many points, but his qualification, “as if of extension”, with respect to God would seem 
to imply that God only shares with bodies the property of occupying the points of space, 
i.e., that “divine extension”, as he also calls it, lacks the dimensional extension of body 
across the points of space, even though “[God] is not at one point only”. Since space is 
continuous (“space cannot be broken into two by any force, but remains continuous, the 
same, and motionless”, Gassendi 1972, 395), and since God only occupies the points of 
this continuous space (e.g., he elsewhere refers to God’s “immensity according to which 
he is present in every place”, 1972, 396; emphasis added), it thus follows that only the 
topological properties of space are applicable to God, but not the metrical properties of 
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space.9 Put differently, while God and matter share topological structure, the holenmerist 
doctrine that God is “whole in every part” undermines the ascription of Euclidean 
metrical structure to this being—hence, FGL(top). Furthermore, since Gassendi accepts 
that space is three-dimensional and Euclidean in structure at the ontological level of 
bodies (see, e.g., Grant 1981, 210), and is independent of matter, he sides with Newton in 
accepting our form of geometric platonism, ML(plt). Specifically, while God is not really 
extended, God grounds a form of incorporeal extension that is congruent to the corporeal 
dimensions of body at that ontological level, and this fact accounts for the dimensionality 
of any vacuum: space is “an incorporeal and immobile extension in which it is possible to 
designate length, width, and depth so that every object might have its place . . . .” 
(Gassendi 1972, 391). Hence, the congruence of incorporeal and corporeal 
dimensionality justifies our “Platonic” designation as regards his spatial geometry at the 
macro-level, since the dimensionality of space and the place of every body are 
independent of material existents. In conclusion: FGL(top), ML(plt).  
In addition, God’s ontological role is unique in Gassendi’s natural philosophy, given 
his further contention that space and time, which are infinite, are neither substances nor 
accidents but a more general category of being (1972, 384). He reasons that “since it 
follows from the perfection of the divine essence that it be eternal and immense, all time 
and space are therefore connoted”, and insists that God “both exists supremely in Himself 
. . . [and] also necessarily exists in all time and in every place” (1976, 94). In short, there 
is a form of co-dependence between God and space: “That God be in space is thought to 
be a characteristic external to His essence, but not with respect to His immensity, the 
conception of which necessarily involves the conception of space” (1976, 94; cf. Newton 
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above).10 Therefore, although God is not the cause of space and time for Gassendi (or for 
Newton), the fact that God’s immensity entails infinite space, and God exists necessarily, 
hence justifies our FGL(top) classification.  
3.4. Leibniz on Spatial Ontology. While Leibniz’ accepts that God’s immensity 
grounds space, as noted in section 2.2, his many criticisms of a spatially extended God in 
the Clarke correspondence (e.g., L.V.50), clearly rule out a similarity of geometric 
structure at both the foundational and material levels of reality—and the same holds for 
his basic ontological unit of ontology (other than God), namely, monads: as simple 
substances, they have no parts, “[b]ut where there are no parts, neither extension, nor 
shape, nor divisibility is possible” (AG 213). The non-spatiality of the monads is, in fact, 
a common theme in Leibniz’ late work: e.g., “there is no spatial or absolute nearness or 
distance among monads” (L.607); and, “monads, in and of themselves, have no position 
with respect to one another, that is, no real position which extends beyond the order of 
phenomena” (AG 201). Accordingly: FGL(prg). Yet, Leibniz’s version of FGL(prg) is 
quite different from Gassendi’s non-metrical conception of God, a difference that is most 
clearly exposed in his rejection of holenmerism in the correspondence with Clarke: “[t]o 
say [a soul] is, the whole of it, in every part of the body is to make it divisible of itself. To 
fix it to a point, to diffuse it all over many points, are only abusive expressions, idola 
tribus” (Leibniz and Clarke 2000, 16-17; L.III.12). In contrast to both Newton’s 
“determined quantities of extension” hypothesis of an extended God and Gassendi’s 
holenmerist idea of an unextended God, Leibniz rebuffs the notion that “God discerns 
what passes in the world by being present to the things”, rather, God discerns things “by 
the dependence on him of the continuation of their existence, which may be said to 
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involve a continual production of them . . .” (2000, 56; L.V.85). In short, “God is not 
present to things by situation but by essence; his presence is manifested by his immediate 
operation” (2000, 16-17; L.III.12), where “immediate operation” is correlated with the 
continual conservation or reproduction of the world. 
Turning to the geometric platonism/nominalism issue, since “there is no space where 
there is no matter” (L.V.62), Leibniz opts for a geometric nominalism at the material 
level, ML(nom).11 Yet, although space is not “an absolute being” (L.III.5), it still 
represents “real truths” (L.V.47), even in the absence of matter: “[t]ime and space are of 
the nature of eternal truths, which equally concern the possible and the actual” 
(NE:II.xiv.26), and “truth and reality are grounded in God, like all eternal truths” 
(NE:II.xiii.17). The God-grounded “truths” concerning space, accordingly, also 
determine the range of possibilities for the arrangement of bodies in space. On the 
numerous ways that the world could be filled with matter, Leibniz states that “there 
would be as much as there possibly can be, given the capacity of time and space (that is, 
the capacity of the order of possible existence); in a word, it is just like tiles laid down so 
as to contain as many as possible in a given area.” (AG 151). Since these truths are 
independent of existing bodies, this form of explanation, in effect, betrays a strong 
penchant for absolutism—but, it is an absolutism about the truths of geometry conceived 
in a nominalist fashion, secured via God’s immensity. On this rather slender, but hugely 
important, issue—geometric platonism versus nominalism—one can trace most of the 
significant differences between Newton and Leibniz (and others) on space.12 
At this point, a few words are in order regarding Leibniz’ remarks on the possibility 
of a vacuum, and how this relates to his spatial ontology and the eternal truths of space. 
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In brief, while Leibniz holds that a vacuum is “not in agreement with divine wisdom” 
(AG 170), he often admits that space is not by necessity a plenum, whether outside the 
confines of a finite material world, or within the material world: concerning the former, 
he states that “[a]bsolutely speaking, it appears that God can make the material universe 
finite in extension . . . .” (L.V.30); and, as regards the latter, he judges that “we can refute 
someone who says that if there is a vacuum between two bodies then they touch, since 
two opposite poles within an empty sphere cannot touch—geometry forbids it” 
(NE:II.xv.11). There are even hints that a complete vacuum state is possible, for Leibniz 
explains that God could prevent a monad’s primitive force from bringing about extended 
matter, and thus potentially all of the monads could be effected in this way. In a letter 
from 1692, he states that primitive force is “a higher principle of action and resistance, 
from which extension and impenetrability emanate when God does not prevent it by a 
superior order” (A.I.vii.249; Adams 1994, 351).13 Furthermore, since “there is no space 
where there is no matter” (L.V.62), and “extension must be the affection of something 
extended” (L.IV.9), the Leibnizian void lacks extension. As E. Sylla (2002) explains, 
there were similar theories put forward in the late Medieval period, in particular, by the 
fourteenth century natural philosopher, Nicole Oresme, who accepted a nominalist 
account of space that is strikingly similar to Leibniz’ view on many points. Like Leibniz, 
Oresme contemplates a spherical vacuum that lacks extension, but which nonetheless can 
be attributed a sort of indirect extension by means of the possible bodies that God could 
bring about to fill that void (Sylla 2002, 269-271). In the New Essays, Leibniz adds that 
“[i]f there were a vacuum in space (for instance, if a sphere were empty inside), one 
could establish its size” (NE:II.xv.11). As for a temporal vacuum, on the other hand, “it 
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would be impossible to establish its length”; likewise, “if space were only a line, and if 
bodies were immobile, it would also be impossible to establish the length of the vacuum 
between two bodies” (NE:II.xv.11). Consequently, three-dimensional space allows the 
surrounding bodies to completely determine the size of a vacuum, unlike the contrasting 
one-dimensional cases he constructs. This would appear to explain the intended meaning 
behind Leibniz’ claim, quoted above, about the predetermined capacity of space to be 
filled with bodies (e.g., AG 151), since, although unextended, these void spaces are set 
within a fixed geometric structure secured via God’s immensity (i.e., God’s essence 
grounds the possibilities of space; see section 2.2).   
3.5. Barrow and Descartes on Spatial Ontology. Finally, a brief glance at Barrow and 
Descartes will help to round out our analysis of seventeenth century spatial ontologies. In 
accordance with the prevailing theologically-based ontology of the period, Barrow also 
reckons that space is dependent on God: “there was Space before the World was created, 
and . . . there is now an Extramundane, infinite Space, (where God is present) . . . .” 
(Barrow 1976, 203). By declaring that there was “Space before the World”, this passage 
has platonist overtones, and likely prompted those assessments that group Barrow with 
the absolutists (substantivalists): e.g., Barrow’s “space exactly anticipates Newton’s 
conception of absolute space . . .” (Hall 1990, 210). Nevertheless, Barrow actually 
follows Leibniz’ (and Oresme’s) nominalism, for he explicates space’s “existence” via 
the God-based capacity to receive bodies (in keeping with the Scholastic “imaginary” 
space tradition; see, Grant 1981, chapter 6). For instance, he explains that time “does not 
imply an actual existence, but only the Capacity or Possibility of the Continuance of 
Existence; just as space expresses the Capacity of a Magnitude contain’d in it” (1976, 
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204). Hence, Barrow’s “Space before the World” is the mere capacity to receive bodily 
magnitude, just like Leibniz: ML(nom), and either FGL(prg) or FGL(top), since evidence 
for this last categorization is lacking.  
Descartes’ conception of space shares many features in common with Leibniz’ views, 
especially the espousal of God’s “extension by power”: where “[s]uch a power, being 
only a mode in the [corporeal] thing to which it is applied, could not be understood to be 
extended once the extended thing corresponding to it is taken away” (Descartes 1991, 
373). As he later notes, “[i]t is certain that God’s essence must be present everywhere for 
his power to be able to manifest itself everywhere; . . .” (1991, 381); and, despite his 
substance dualism, he adds that “[i]n the case of all other substances [besides God], we 
perceive that they can exist only with the help of God’s concurrence” (Descartes 1985, 
210). Therefore, as with Leibniz, God is the foundation of space by way of matter, and 
“since it is a complete contradiction that a particular extension should belong to nothing” 
(1985, 230), a vacuum is impossible: ML(nom), FGL(prg). 
3.6. Reflections on Modern Relationism and Leibniz’ Spatial Ontology. As we have 
seen, Leibniz’ conception of the geometric truths of space are both grounded by God and 
independent of matter: e.g., “[t]ime and space are of the nature of eternal truths, which 
equally concern the possible and the actual” (NE:II.xiv.26); “truth and reality are 
grounded in God, like all eternal truths” (NE:II.xiii.17); and, concerning how the world 
can be filled with matter, “there would be as much as there possibly can be, given the 
capacity of time and space (that is, the capacity of the order of possible existence); in a 
word, it is just like tiles laid down so as to contain as many as possible in a given area” 
(AG 151). Some commentators, such as Belot (2011, 2), have inferred from this evidence 
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that Leibniz is a realist about geometry at the phenomenal level of matter. However, this 
quite justifiable observation overlooks the fact that Leibniz’ realism about space at this 
level stems from God’s immensity, and so his realism differs in only one significant way 
from Newton’s similar God-grounded spatial realism; namely, platonism versus 
nominalism at the material level, a distinction that evades trivial substantivalism and 
trivial relationism since that dichotomy conflates the ontological and 
geometrical/mathematical aspects of spatial theories. From a modern perspective, one 
might strive to equate Newton’s platonism with a straightforward realism about 
geometric structure at the material level, as well as Leibniz’ nominalism with a modal 
realism at this level, but this approach fails to account for the rationale behind these 
different realist ascriptions, non-modal versus modal: (a) an underlying ontology (God) 
that is actually present in space, thus explaining Newton’s realism, and (b), an underlying 
ontology (God, monads) that is not present in space, thereby explaining Leibniz’ modal 
realism. Put differently, both Leibniz and Newton would deny the assumption that 
bodies/fields alone can ground geometric truths, but this is the exact motivation behind 
the modern approach to spacetime ontology. While any deeper facets of spatial ontology 
were of little interest in the context of classical mechanical and gravitation theories, since 
their focus was naturally fixed on the higher realm of matter or fields, this is no longer 
the case now that the attention of theoretical physicists has shifted to the search for QG. 
Once the microlevel, and a difference between the micro and macro, are thrown into the 
mix, the long forgotten ontological concerns that formed the very basis of the spatial 
theories of seventeenth century natural philosophy suddenly reclaim their once dominate 
status. It is for these reasons that a more nuanced scheme for assessing spatial ontology is 
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required, such as the difference in spatial geometric levels and the platonist/nominalist 
divide utilized in this essay. In short, the standard substantivalist/relationist distinction is 
simply incapable of recording these more fine-grained differences, as is manifest in its 
impoverished and conflicting appraisals of QG (and even GR).     
As just discussed, one might attempt to put forward a modal relationist hypothesis as 
the contemporary equivalent of Leibniz’ nominalism, a strategy expertly developed in 
Belot (2011, 173-185). While Belot’s efforts are quite informative, it nonetheless seems 
to strain the coherence of relationist doctrine. A true modal relationist must, presumably, 
posit spatial (spatiotemporal) modality on actually existing matter/fields, or on the 
possibility of matter/fields coming into existence. Leibniz’ hypotheses, on the contrary, 
fix the truths of spatial structure, not on bodies or on the possibilities of bodies, but on 
God: “He is the source of possibilities and of existents alike, the one by his essence and 
the other by his will. So that space like time derives its reality only from him” 
(NE:II.xv.2). Likewise, a complete and permanent vacuum state does seem plausible 
given Leibniz’ additional claim that God could block the emergence of extended matter 
(see section 3.4). If one is forced to choose between substantivalism and relationism, 
consequently, then Leibniz’ spatial hypotheses would seem to fall more comfortably on 
the absolutist/substantivalist side of the debate, and not modal relationism. Indeed, a 
theory whose fixed (nominalist) spatial truths and structures do not depend on 
matter/fields—but instead posits that matter, and hence the instantiated truths of space, 
emerge from a deeper and quite different layer of ontology (in this case, monads)—not 
only eludes modal relationist doctrine, but would seem to demand a separate 
classification beyond traditional substantivalism and relationism. That dichotomy, once 
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again, grew out of the classical theories of nineteenth and twentieth century macrolevel 
physics, but struggles to find applicability and relevance within the context of QG, an 
observation first disclosed in section 1.  
 
4. Platonism/Nominalism, Geometric Background, and the Shift Arguments.  
4.1. Background Dependence/Independence. While philosophers of space and time 
have largely ignored the significance of the platonism/nominalism distinction for 
interpreting the substantival/relational dispute, a close cousin of the ML(plt)/ML(nom) 
divide can be detected in one of the central themes connected to the search for QG, 
namely, background independence. Among the competing interpretations of this doctrine 
(see, Rickles 2008, 352-355, for excellent survey), background independence can be 
minimally construed as the “freedom from ‘background structures’, where a background 
structure is some element of the theory that is fixed across the models of the theory” 
(French and Rickles 2006, 1-2, n.1). The metric is normally the structural element at 
issue, hence the variable metric in GR marks that theory as background independent. 
Likewise, as French and Rickles go on to note, “background independence, when used in 
the context of quantum gravity, is usually meant in a restricted sense, covering the 
freedom from a background metric alone” (2006, 2, n.1). Conversely, if a theory’s metric 
is background dependent, then all formulations of the theory must conform to a 
predetermined, fixed geometry regardless of the matter configuration or other factors. 
This last stance is consistent with ML(plt), of course; but, since Euclidean geometry is 
standard throughout the seventeenth century, it would appear that all of these earlier 
theories are background dependent, including the ML(nom) cases. For instance, Leibniz 
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defines “distance” in the New Essays as “the size of the shortest possible line that can be 
drawn from one [point or extended object] to another”, and comments that “[t]his 
distance can be taken either absolutely or relative to some figure which contains the two 
distant things”, and where “a straight line is absolutely the distance between two points” 
(NE:II.xiii.3). Leibniz’ choice of the term “absolute” to signify the Euclidean concept of 
a straight line (as the shortest distance) thereby calls into question those attempts, such as 
Smolin (2006, 201), to enlist Leibniz as an early advocate of the background 
independence cause.14 
4.2. The Shift Arguments. The difference between geometric platonism and 
nominalism is also useful for understanding the static and kinematic shift scenarios, as 
well as the structuralism intrinsic to both Newton and Leibniz’ respective approaches 
(see, French and Rickles (2006) for an investigation of structuralism with respect to the 
substantivalist/relationist debate). Since structuralism is concerned with the structural 
relationship among things, as opposed to the things themselves, it is often regarded as 
more akin to relationism than substantivalism. Nevertheless, Newton takes a very 
structuralist line on the identity of the parts of space, a strategy that he employs to 
demonstrate “the immobility of space” (Newton 2004, 25). The parts of space cannot 
move because “[t]he parts of duration and space are understood to be the same as they 
really are only because of their mutual order and position; nor do they have any principle 
of individuation apart from that order and position, which consequently cannot be 
altered” (2004, 25). Given Newton’s geometric platonism, and the fact that an immobile 
God grounds the parts of space, it follows that an identical configuration of bodies can 
occupy many different positions in space, static shifts, as well as motions in space, 
 28 
kinematic shifts.  
Leibniz’ structuralism, on the other hand, is best understood via his nominalism. 
Because God’s essence serves as the foundation of the Euclidean capacity of space (as 
above), and space depends on bodies, nominalism entails that there can be only one 
instantiation of the same relative configuration of bodies, unlike on Newton’s scheme. 
For example, if space “is nothing at all without bodies but the possibility of placing them, 
then those two states, the one such as it is now, the other supposed to be the quite 
contrary way [static shift], would not at all differ from one another” L.III.5). Specifically, 
if space is only God’s idea prior to the material world’s instantiation of space—i.e., “the 
possibility of placing them”, secured via God’s essence—then to claim that the material 
world could have had a different spatial location while retaining its relative configuration 
(e.g., the material world has been uniformly repositioned three feet to the left) is to 
demand that space must exist both prior to, and independently of, the material world’s 
instantiation of matter (since this prior and independent existence of space is the only 
way that the same relative configuration of bodies can obtain a different position in 
space). But, of course, this is just what Leibniz nominalism denies, and thus a uniform 
and unobservable static shift would amount to nothing more, on Leibniz’ scheme, than a 
relabeling of the places already instantiated by the material world, which is a mere 
difference in scale or gauge.  
The same holds true for any kinematic shift, since any uniform addition or subtraction 
of speed or difference in direction as regards all bodies does not effect the dynamical 
interconnections among those bodies—and it is the dynamical interactions among bodies 
that is associated with space at the macrolevel (see section 2.2). At a deeper level, the 
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motions of bodies ultimately results from the internal forces that comprise the monads, 
and which are manifest in the derivative force of bodies: “as for motion, what is real in it 
is force or power; that is to say, what there is in the present state which carries with it a 
change in the future” (FW 207); “I, however, do not consider motion to be a derivative 
force but think rather that motion, being change, follows from such force” (L 533). 
Consequently, given his unique conception of force, any equal change in the velocity 
(speed or direction) of the world’s occupants would only result in a different total 
numerical value of the whole world’s conserved quantity, which Leibniz measures as 
mv2; but, this would represent merely another undetectable difference in scale factor. Put 
differently, motion derives from internal forces for Leibniz, and so a uniform change in 
the velocity of all of the world’s inhabitants is just a uniform addition or subtraction of 
the world’s force, which thereby renders the change equivalent to those thought 
experiments that, say, double the size of all of the world’s objects (and which are often 
regarded as indiscernible).  
To sum up, the platonist/nominalist divide helps to elucidate the different forms of 
structuralism intrinsic to both Newton and Leibniz’ theories, as well as assists in 
understanding the rationale behind Leibniz’ rejection of the shift arguments (although his 
rejection of kinematic shifts requires a nominalism that is conjoined with his belief in the 
dynamical interconnections of all bodies, which in turn stems from the primitive force of 
monads). Yet, it is important to note that other nominalist approaches to space, similar to 
Leibniz’ version, did admit uniform shifts of the entire material world, and this difference 
might be traceable to the difference between FGL(top) and FGL(prg) surveyed above, 
which in the seventeenth century stands for the difference between, respectively, 
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holenmerism and the extension of power. As first introduced in section 3.4, Oresme treats 
an intra-world vacuum along the same lines as Leibniz, employing possible bodies, yet, 
unlike Leibniz, he reckons that God could move the entire world in a rectilinear 
kinematic shift (1968, 369). For Oresme, whose deep ontology of space is much closer to 
Gassendi’s than Leibniz’ ontology, God’s immensity is both classified as “whole in every 
part” holenmerism,15 and identified with all spaces/places, including the vacuum outside 
the world (see, also, Grant 1981, 350, n.127; 349, n.123).16 Hence, while Oresme’s 
nominalism correlates with ML(nom), his ontology accepts FGL(top) by way of 
holenmerism. Given that holenmerism posits God’s unextended but point-like presence in 
space (as is also the case with Gassendi’s God), there is, accordingly, a consistent basis 
upon which to posit a kinematic shift of the world—i.e., God’s actual presence in space, 
even though it is a non-dimensional, point-like presence. While not possessing any 
dimensional quantity, Oresme’s deep ontology of space, i.e., God, can surely register the 
change of the material world’s position from one point to another, presumably as a sort of 
topological change, and so a kinematic shift makes sense on this scheme (although the 
distance traversed would be indeterminate given the lack of geometric quantity). Leibniz, 
on the other hand, rejects holenmerism, and favors the extension of power doctrine 
instead, such that God is not actually present in space per se. As discussed in section 3.4, 
since only God’s operation of conserving the world can be situated under the extension of 
power hypothesis, a Leibnizian kinematic shift is thus not applicable on the grounds that 
it is inconsistent with Leibniz’ conception of a non-situated God. Whether or not this 
additional line of argument played a role in Leibniz’ decision to reject the shift scenarios 
remains unclear, needless to say, but it does pose an intriguing possibility since Oresme 
 31 
and Leibniz’ respective spatial theories are nearly identical but diverge quite drastically 
on these two issues, i.e., holenmerism versus extension of power, and kinematic shift 
versus no kinematic shift.                 
 
5. The Deep Metaphysics of Space from the Seventeenth Century to Quantum Gravity.  
The preceding analysis sets the stage for a closer examination of various QG 
hypotheses, background independence, pregeometry,17 spacetime emergence,18 and, 
ultimately, of the deficiencies in the substantivalist/relationist dichotomy as it applies to 
the seventeenth century and QG. 
5.1. Geometric Levels and Quantum Gravity. Returning to our division of spatial 
geometric levels, FGL, there is a fascinating, and apparently natural, analogue of this 
distinction within the diverse array of QG hypotheses (albeit some QG hypotheses will 
pose various classificational difficulties due to their complex and hybrid construction). 
One might question the relevance of this exercise, of course, given that the seventeenth 
century’s preoccupation with the theological underpinnings of space would seem to have 
little in common with the modern search for QG. Yet, as mentioned previously, the 
situation confronting both the seventeenth century and the QG theorist is exactly the 
same: both are concerned with constructing an adequate theory of space, time, and the 
physical world based on a pre-given theory, specifically, the western God, on the one 
hand, and GR and QM, on the other. Both “research programs”, as it were, strive to retain 
the essential features of that underlying theory, but both recognize the need to adapt, 
revise, and sometimes overturn, various elements of the established system in the process 
of securing their respective goals (namely, a spatiotemporal theory grounded upon God, 
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for the seventeenth century, and a spatiotemporal theory that successfully integrates GR 
and QM, for contemporary physics). 
Turning to these analogies, Newton and More’s FGL(met) would seem to correspond 
to the pattern of the earliest geometrodynamic hypotheses, as well the older canonical 
quantization techniques, since these approaches rely upon the general geometric structure 
employed by the foundational theory, which is, respectively, GR and QFT (quantum field 
theory, which is the conjunction of QM and the flat Minkowskian spacetime of special 
relativity). In the (naïve) covariant quantization strategy that flourished up through 
roughly the early 1970s, the metric of the foundational theory, QFT, is split into two 
parts, the fixed background metric (usually Minkowskian), which “defines spacetime, 
namely it defines location and causal relations” (Rovelli 2004, 12), and a dynamical 
component that relies on perturbation techniques to secure the postulated graviton (and 
hence extend QFT to gravity). In the old geometrodynamics (which is not technically a 
QG hypothesis, but similar19), GR is the foundational theory, with the metric and the 
curvature of spacetime taken as the basic groundwork from which all other physical 
phenomena are presumed to be derived or constructed. The geometric outlook that 
motivates geometrodynamics also prompts Sklar’s well-known concept of 
supersubstantivalism: “not only does spacetime have reality and real structural features, 
but in addition, the material objects of the world, its totality of ordinary and extraordinary 
material things, are seen as particular structured pieces of spacetime itself” (1974, 221). 
Newton’s “determined quantities of extension” hypothesis, surveyed in section 3.2, fits 
the supersubstantivalist definition quite nicely, that is, if one substitutes the term 
“spacetime” with the term “God’s spatial extension”. If viewed within the context of the 
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deep metaphysics of space, however, the various attempts to tie Descartes to 
geometrodynamics fail (e.g., Graves 1971, 87), since Descartes grounds space (= matter) 
on a non-spatial, non-geometric conception of God, as we have seen.  
In addition, the first period or phase of String theory, roughly up through the mid-
1990s, would likely fit the FGL(met) category as well. Despite invoking a number of 
compactified extra dimensions at the microlevel,20 the perturbative method employed by 
these theories presupposes a classical spacetime backdrop and its metric:  
[T]he propagation of the [one-dimensional] string is viewed as a map X : → M from a 
two-dimensional worldsheet W to spacetime M (the ‘target spacetime’). The 
quantization procedure quantizes X, but not the metric γ on M, which remains 
classical. . . . [T]he classical spacetime metric γ on M satisfies a set of field equations 
that are equivalent to (the supergravity version of) Einstein’s field equations for 
general relativity plus small correction of Planck size: this is the sense in which 
general relativity emerges from string theory as a low-energy limit. (Butterfield and 
Isham 2001, 71)         
 
While the metric at the microlevel and macrolevel are, approximately, the same in these 
string theories, hence FGL(met), the already significant topological differences at these 
two levels have evolved into a potentially more radical set of dissimilarities in the second 
phase of non-perturbative string theories. As Butterfield and Isham note, concerning the 
possibility that there might exist a minimum spacetime length in these later approaches 
(via the duality symmetries), “these developments suggest rather strongly that the 
manifold conception of spacetime is not applicable at the Planck length; but is only an 
emergent notion, approximately valid at much larger length-scales” (Butterfield and 
Isham 2001, 73; and, Witten 1989, 350-351). Consequently, the trajectory of the 
development of non-perturbative string theories seems headed towards FGL(prg), where 
the foundational level of ontology exhibits entirely different geometric structures than at 
the macrolevel: i.e., contra FGL(met), a discrete geometry at the microlevel, but the 
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standard differential geometry of the macrolevel emergent theory (GR); and, contra 
FGL(top), a topology at the microlevel that likewise diverges from the macrolevel 
topological structure. 
The well-known rival of string theory is, of course, LQG (loop quantum gravity), 
which does not rely upon a classical metric, unlike string theory. As a later variant of the 
canonical quantization program, a theory like LQG “uses a background dimensional 
manifold (but it uses no metric)”, where this (spatial) manifold “becomes part of the fixed 
background in the quantum theory—so that . . . there is no immediate possibility in 
discussing quantum changes in the spatial topology” (Butterfield and Isham 2001, 76). 
Therefore, LQG upholds FGL(top). So, regarding the question that first prompted our 
investigation, i.e., “Which seventeenth century philosophy of space best resembles the 
structure of LGQ?”, we are finally in a position to provide an answer: it is neither 
Smolin’s choice of Leibniz, who accepts FGL(prg), nor Dainton’s preference for Newton, 
who endorses FGL(met)—rather, it is Gassendi, since he endorses FGL(top)! As 
discussed in section 3.4, by declaring that “there is no spatial or absolute nearness or 
distance among monads” (L.607), it follows that any ascription of metrical properties to 
Leibniz’ monadic ontology is ruled out, but so would most topological properties. A 
topological space involves a neighborhoods of points and their various non-metrical 
interrelationships, such as continuity and connectedness. Yet, since monads have “no 
position with respect to one another”, and each monad is “a certain world of its own, 
having no connections of dependency except with God” (AG 199), even these weaker 
topological notions are apparently excluded. In short, the structure of a continuous 
manifold at the foundational level, FGL(top), is incompatible with Leibniz’ spatial 
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ontology at that level, but not with respect to Gassendi’s, for the latter situates God in the 
points of a Euclidean space and its corresponding continuous topology (but not the 
former), as explained in section 3.3. 
5.2. Pregeometry: Leibniz and QG. There is, however, a group of modern QG 
strategies that would seem analogous to the pregeometry of monads, namely, start with a 
mere set of points, M, without topological or differential structure, and build the 
continuous topological and metrical macrolevel structures from this foundation. On 
Butterfield and Isham’s estimation, “this set is formless, its only general geometrical 
property being its cardinal number”, and is such that “there are no relations between the 
elements of M, and no special way of labeling any such elements [i.e., no topology]” 
(2001, 81). Butterfield and Isham’s analysis is part of a larger discussion of alternative 
QG strategies, different from string theory and LQG, where the quantization is imposed 
“below the metric”. Quantum effects and structures can then be introduced at this lower 
level and associated, depending on the particular QG scheme, with any of a host of sub-
metric structures, e.g., M, causal, algebraic, topological, differential, etc., in an ascending 
hierarchy (with different hierarchies erected based on the particular QG strategy). These 
sub-metric QM structures thus lie underneath, and can be said to generate or bring about, 
GR and QM’s common geometrical presuppositions as employed in their standard 
mathematical formalisms, i.e., a Lorentzian metric on a four-dimensional topological, 
differentiable manifold. Among these different strategies, the most Leibnizian might 
reside in the utilization of a commutative ring of differentiable functions (e.g., C* 
algebras) in lieu of a differentiable manifold, since the main goal of Leibniz’ analysis 
situs is to provide an algebraic model of spatial situation (L 248-249), and is thus in 
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keeping with his overall worldview that takes algebra/arithmetic as primary, and 
geometry as derived.21       
There are many QG theories that fit this general category: e.g., causal sets, spin foam 
models, computational universe, etc. For example:  
Causal set theory arises by combining discreteness and causality to create a substance 
that can be the basis of a theory of quantum gravity. Spacetime is thereby replaced by 
a vast assembly of discrete “elements” organized by means of “relations” between 
them into a “partially ordered set” or “poset” for short. None of the continuum 
attributes of spacetime, neither metric, topology nor differentiable structure, are 
retained, but emerge it is hoped as approximate concepts at macroscales. (Dowker 
2005, 446) 
 
In what follows, however, we will concentrate on the quantum causal histories program 
(QCH). R. Hedrich provides the colorful description, “geometrogenesis”, for the process 
by which “spacetime emerges from a pregeometric quantum substrate” in QCH (Hedrich 
2009a, 22), with this substrate correlating with the set M and a causal structure in 
Butterfield and Isham’s account. 
[QCH’s] basic assumptions are: There is no continuous spacetime on the substrate 
level. The fundamental level does not even contain any spacetime degrees of freedom 
at all. — Causal order is more fundamental than properties of spacetime, like metric 
or topology. — Causal relations are to be found on the substrate level in form of 
elementary causal network structures. . . . [M]acroscopic spacetime is necessarily 
dynamical, because it results from a background-independent pregeometric dynamics. 
But, the dynamics of the effective degrees of freedom on the macro-level are 
necessarily decoupled from the dynamics of the substrate degrees of freedom. If they 
would not be decoupled, there would not be any spacetime or gravity on the macro-
level, because there is none on the substrate level. In the same way, causality on the 
macro-level, finding its expression in the macro-level interactions, is decoupled from 
causality on the substrate-level. And spacetime-locality on the macro-level, if it 
emerges from the dynamics of coherent excitation states, has nothing to do with 
locality on the substrate graph structure level. (Hedrich 2009a, 22-23) 
 
The analogue of these QG hypotheses will be readily evident to the Leibnizian devotee. 
First, monads and their intrinsic primitive forces correspond to the discrete elementary 
quantum events, which in the QCH program are excitation states in a finite-dimensional 
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Hilbert space (as the discrete nodes in a graph structure).22 For Leibniz, matter and space 
emerge from a micro-realm that, like QM and QG theories, is more aptly described in 
terms of force: a monad is “endowed with primitive power” such that the “derivative 
forces [of bodies] are only modifications and resultants of the primitive forces” (AG 
176). Second, the derivative nature of the spatial and dynamical properties of bodies, as 
opposed to the intrinsic primitive forces of the non-spatial, non-material monads which 
brings about bodies, thus correlates with Hedrich’s technical term “decoupling”: that is, 
the emergence of a macrolevel of spatial and dynamical properties that is quite different 
from, and seemingly independent of, the pre-spatial and dynamical properties at the 
microlevel that generate the macrolevel properties (“spacetime-locality on the macro-
level, if it emerges from the dynamics of coherent excitation states, has nothing to do 
with locality on the substrate graph structure level”). For Leibniz, monads (like God) are 
not in space per se, but they are the means by which God “brings about” matter and, 
hence, instantiates his nominalist account of space: “[c]ertainly monads cannot be 
properly in absolute place, since they are not really ingredients but merely requisites of 
matter” (L.607); and, “properly speaking, matter is not composed of constitutive unities 
[monads], but results from them” (AG 179; see, e.g., Rutherford 1995a, for an extended 
analysis). Much has been written on whether or not monads are really in space (see, e.g., 
Cover and Hartz 1994), a debate inflamed by these kinds of fairly opaque quotations;23 
yet, QG theories provide a concrete example of the type of world view that Leibniz was 
likely striving to establish (see, Garber 2009, 383-384, who briefly mentions a similar 
interpretation). 
A third similarity between QCH and Leibniz relates to one of the major themes of our 
 38 
investigation, namely, nominalism:  
But what are these coherent, propagating excitation states, resulting from the 
substrate dynamics and leading to spacetime and gravity? And how do they give rise 
to spacetime and gravity?—The answer given by the Quantum Causal Histories 
approach consists in a coupling of geometrogenesis to the genesis of matter. The idea 
is that the coherent excitation states resulting from and at the same time dynamically 
decoupled from the substrate dynamics are matter degrees of freedom. And they give 
rise to spacetime, because they behave as if they were living in a spacetime. (Hedrich 
2009a, 23). 
 
By its “coupling of geometrogenesis to the genesis of matter”, i.e., that the emergence of 
space is coupled to the emergence of matter, QCH can truly claim a lineage with Leibniz’ 
brand of nominalism, as opposed to the matter-less platonism of LQG. A vacuum state 
occurs in LQG when the s-knots (equivalence classes of spin networks formed by spatial 
diffeomorphisms), which secure the QM basis of space, lack the requisite quantum 
excitations needed for the existence of matter (“the quantum state of the gravitational 
field is such that it has no excitations”, Rickles 2005, 426). The quantization strategy 
employed in LQG, which admits vacuum solutions but retains its s-knot quantum 
geometry, is thus closer to the matter-based platonism of Newton and Gassendi, unlike 
Leibniz and QCH, which both link the emergence/actualization of space (spacetime) to 
the emergence of matter. Of the two theories, LQG and QCH, there are other reasons for 
preferring QCH as more comparable to Leibniz’ monadic system. The result of LQG’s 
quantization of the metric of GR is an array of spin networks with finite area and volume, 
which essentially constitutes “quantum chunks” of space (Rovelli 2001, 110). The QM-
rooted spin networks are therefore inconsistent with the non-spatial, non-geometric 
character of monads, and the same is true of the spatial diffeomorphisms required to form 
the s-knots from the spin networks (since diffeomorphisms are geometric transformations 
on a differential, hence continuous, manifold, contra Leibniz’ FGL(prg)). Moreover, 
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given the direct quantization of GR’s metric, gravity is rendered a fundamental 
interaction for LQG; but gravity is emergent for both Leibniz and QCH, since it is tied to 
the existence of matter at the macro-scale. Rather, the spin networks in LQG, which are 
contiguous discrete chunks of a quantum field, are much closer to Leibniz’ conception of 
contiguous discrete chucks of matter, as opposed to the non-contiguous discrete objects 
that comprise his pregeometric monadic metaphysics. This last point is nicely explained 
by Rovelli as it pertains to LQG: 
This discreteness of the geometry, implied by the conjunction of GR and QM, is very 
different from the naive idea that the world is made by discrete bits of something. It is 
like the discreteness of the quanta of the excitations of a harmonic oscillator. A 
generic state of spacetime will be a continuous quantum superposition of states whose 
geometry has discrete features, not a collection of elementary discrete objects. 
(Rovelli 2001, 110) 
 
Once again, this description more accurately tracks Leibniz’ material plenum, as opposed 
to the deep metaphysical entities, monads, that underlie his material realm. 
Nevertheless, there is one significant issue on which Leibniz’ monadic system 
diverges from QG theories, namely, causal or dynamical structure at the microlevel, like 
QCH’s quantum channels (the lines of the graphs that connect the vertices). Because 
“monads have no windows through which something can enter or leave” (AG 214) there 
is as an absence of any inter-monadic causal mechanism at that scale. What is needed is a 
mechanism that could connect or interrelate the monads so as to generate matter and 
space, a process that would roughly correlate with the dynamics of the pregeometric 
substrate in QCH. One might be tempted to interpret Leibniz’ enigmatic concept of a 
“substantial chain”, which appears in the late correspondence with Des Bosses, as a 
remedy for the lack of an inter-monadic connection, where a substantial chains is defined 
as “something substantial which is the subject of [the monads’] common predicates and 
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modifications, that is, the subject of the predicates and modifications joining them 
together” (AG 203). Leibniz’ preferred monadic view, in brief, is to characterize the 
continuous mathematical structure of space and time as “ideal”, whereas real existents are 
discrete: “For space is something continuous, but ideal, whereas mass is discrete, indeed 
an actual multiplicity, or a being by aggregation, but one from infinite unities [monads]. 
In actual things, simples are prior to aggregates; in ideals things, the whole is prior to the 
part” (LDB 141). In the letters to Des Bosses, however, Leibniz suggests that the 
substantial chain introduces real continuity into the world of existents: “[r]eal continuity 
can arise only from a substantial chain” (AG 203). Nevertheless, like matter, “monads 
aren’t really ingredients of this thing [substantial chain] which is added [to the monads], 
but requisites for it . . .” (AG 198). That is, the substantial chain is a property that “results 
from” the monads, as is also the case with matter. In fact, in a passage cited previously, 
Leibniz provides the very same explanation for the emergence of matter as he does for 
the substantial chain: “[c]ertainly monads cannot be properly in absolute place, since they 
are not really ingredients but merely requisites of matter” (L.607). Therefore, the 
substantial chain arises at the macrolevel, and so it does not constitute the sought-after 
microlevel connection.24  
5.3. Background Independence/Dependence and Geometric Nominalism. From the 
modern QG perspective, Smolin has argued that the substantival/relational dichotomy 
converts to a dispute over background dependent/independent methods (Smolin 2006, 
199), thus it follows that the fixed background metric and point manifold employed by 
the early varieties of string theory renders those theories more substantivalist (absolutist) 
than the alternative QG options that only rely on a point manifold, such as LQG. As 
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noted earlier, however, the utilization of the manifold’s topological, dimensional, and 
differential structure can still be deemed to violate a fully background independent 
scheme, and it is for these reasons Smolin declares that LQG is only partially relational 
(2006, 215). Nevertheless, whether it is metric or manifold structure that counts as a more 
substantivalist orientation is itself a contentious issue; see, Earman (1989, chaps. 8 and 
9), for a defense of manifold structure as the better candidate. If one accepts Earman’s 
argument, then LQG and Covariant Quantization theories are both equally substantivalist, 
contra Smolin, since both employ a point manifold. A further obstacle for Smolin’s 
attempt to link the substantivalism/relationism dichotomy to background 
dependence/independence is that one of the most substantivalist leaning theories, 
geometrodynamics, which Sklar associates with supersubstantivalism, is background 
independent, and thereby should count as relationist given Smolin’s conjecture (see 
section 5.1).  
A somewhat different way of explaining the inadequacy of using the background 
dependence/independence divide as a substitute for the substantival/relational dichotomy 
connects with our earlier analysis of platonism and nominalism. In short, whether the 
background geometry is fixed or variable is not relevant to the platonist/nominalist 
distinction; rather, it is the presence of geometric structure in the absence of all physical 
entities or processes that is crucial, since that possibility would violate nominalism. For 
similar reasons, the argument that LQG is in conflict with relationism, because it allows 
vacuum solutions (see, Rickles 2005, 425; Earman 2006, 21) is misleading due to the fact 
that the underlying quantum processes, spin networks and the s-knots constructed from 
them, remain even in vacuum solutions. Hence, while the traditional matter-based 
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conceptions of spatial relationism and nominalism are indeed undermined by these 
vacuum solutions, the finite value of the vacuum energy and its effects (virtual particles, 
Casimir effect, etc.) in QM and QFT upholds a non-matter, field-based form of 
nominalism, since there are no voids totally absent of energy (likewise for sophisticated 
metric-field relationist interpretations of GR, for gravity waves in an otherwise empty 
unverse carry energy). Moreover, Leibniz would seem to support the possibility of an 
analogous vacuum state (see section 3.4, and the A.I.vii.249 quote). Unlike LQG, 
however, Leibniz’ nominalist spatial geometry is only instantiated by matter, and so a 
matter-less world is absent any spatial geometry, whereas LQG’s vacuum state retains its 
s-knot spatial structure—it is for these reasons that Gassendi’s theory more closely 
resembles LQG than Leibniz’ theory, as first mentioned in section 5.1. 
Furthermore, any attempt to foist a non-reductive spacetime “fundamentalism” on all 
ontological appraisals of QG theories can be defeated employing the same nominalist line 
of argument. Earman, in particular, has offered the following defense of a non-reductive 
spacetime construal of LQG:  
[A]lthough classical general relativistic spacetime has been demoted from a 
fundamental to an emergent entity, spacetime per se has not been banished as a 
fundamental entity. After all, what LQG offers is a quantization of classical general 
relativistic spacetime, and it seems not unfair to say that what it describes is quantum 
spacetime. This entity retains a fundamental status in LQG since there is no attempt 
to reduce it to something more fundamental. (Earman 2006, 21)         
 
Yet, to portray the physical Hilbert space of LQG as a fundamental entity (where 
“fundamentalism” is, presumably, a species of substantivalism) is to beg the question 
against a non-fundamentalist interpretation, for it seems much more plausible to invoke 
the nominalist conclusion that the Hilbert structure is linked to the existence of physical 
quantum states; i.e., quantum states are the fundamental entities, not the Hilbert space. 
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Put differently, it appears totally unwarranted to saddle the physical quantum states with 
a sort of platonic Hilbert space, i.e., as a fundamental entity, since that would entail that 
the Hilbert space could remain in existence even in the absence of the physical quantum 
states, contra nominalism. Furthermore, as Dieks correctly points out with regard to non-
relativistic QM, “the Hilbert space formalism does not start from a space-time manifold 
in which particles are located. The quantum state is given by a vector in Hilbert space, 
and has in general no special relation to specific space-time points. Rather, ‘position’ is 
treated in the same way as ‘spin’ or other quantities that are direct particle properties: all 
the quantities are ‘observables’, represented by Hermetian operators in Hilbert space” 
(Dieks 2001, 16). Consequently, Earman’s own defense of the point manifold as the basis 
of substantivalism is not applicable in the case of traditional non-relativistic QM, and, 
with respect to relativistic QM theories, it is the physical QM field that serves as the 
nominalist-friendly fundamental entity.      
More carefully, recalling the distinction first introduced in section 3.1, if the 
platonism/nominalism question is pushed to the fundamental or foundational level of 
ontology, FL(plt) and FL(nom), then all of our examined theories, whether from the 
seventeenth or twentieth/twenty-first centuries, align with nominalism, FL(nom). As 
revealed in this essay, God is the entity required for the existence of space in the 
seventeenth century, thereby securing a nominalist foundation for space via this unique 
(immaterial) entity. In the same way, modern QG theories are not committed to a platonic 
background structure given the complete nonexistence of the relevant QG entities and 
processes. For the seventeenth century and QG theories, geometric background structures 
are predicated on the physical (or metaphysical) processes associated with its 
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foundational entity, which favors the nominalist position.  
Nominalism at the foundational level operates somewhat differently than at the 
material level, however. At this foundational level, seventeenth century philosophers only 
required a sort of congruence of the domain of the God’s substance or operation and the 
extent of space, since they all reject the inherence conception that treats space as an 
internal accident of God (with the exception of More and possibly other Cambridge neo-
platonists, such as Raphson; see, More 1995, 56-57). For all of the seventeenth century 
thinkers surveyed above, space is not “external” to God. To be exact, space cannot 
exceed either the bounds of God’s own extension (Newton and More) or God’s non-
extended immensity, where that non-extended immensity can take the form of either 
holenmerism (Gassendi and Charelton) or the extension of power (Descartes and 
Leibniz). As previously disclosed, Newton denies “that a dwarf-god should fill only a 
tiny part of infinite space” (Newton 1978, 123), and Gassendi claims that “since it 
follows from the perfection of the divine essence that it be eternal and immense, all time 
and space are therefore connoted” (Gassendi 1976, 94). For Leibniz, “[t]he immensity 
and eternity of God are things more transcendent than the duration and extension of 
creatures, . . . .”, yet, “[t]hose divine attributes do not imply the supposition of things 
extrinsic to God, such as are actual places and times” (L.V.106). This dependence of 
space on God is further revealed in his rejection of the idea that space is God’s place, 
since that would imply that “there would be a thing [space] coeternal with God and 
independent of him” (L.V.79). Hence, while God is not situated in space for Leibniz, 
God’s extension of power, which is situated, is at least congruent with the world’s actual 
or possible spatial extension; if not, space would be independent of God. Finally, since 
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monads generate the matter that instantiates space (and are a sort of interface between 
Leibniz’ God and the material world), it naturally follows that space is not independent of 
the monads. 
In a similar fashion, there is a sort of congruence of the physical quantum states and 
their Hilbert spaces, or the field in QFT and its Minkowski spacetime, in that the QM-
based QG theories do not sanction void spaces entirely devoid of energy, where an 
absolute void would imply that the geometry at this foundational level exceeds the 
bounds of, or is external to, its physical entities/fields and their associated states and 
observables. One could even go so far as to claim a certain analogy between God’s 
grounding the possibilities of bodies at the macro-level in Leibniz’ spatial ontology (as 
above, NE:II.xv.2), and, for a physical system in QM, the state vectors grounding the 
probability of the physical observables in a Hilbert space. In many of the pregeometric 
QG hypotheses, in fact, it is often claimed that macrolevel space emerges from “internal” 
QM processes, a description that upholds the nominalist ban on entirely void, i.e., 
platonic, spaces: e.g., in the model of Kaplunovsky and Weinstein (1985), “the 
distinction between ‘geometric’ and ‘internal’ degrees of freedom can be seen as a low-
energy artifact that has only phenomenological relevance. Space is finally nothing more 
than a fanning out of a quantum mechanical state spectrum” (Hedrich 2009a, 16).  
Turning to string theory, the development of background independent, non-
perturbative techniques (string field theory) would seem to have alleviated many of the of 
the above worries, yet, even leaving aside these background independent advances, as 
long as any string theory does not sanction void spaces absent the strings and their 
vibrations and interactions, even the fixed background structure of the older forms of 
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string theory can be seen as siding with nominalism over platonism. Given the rise of the 
braneworld scenarios in M-theory (a further development of string theory), another 
potential nominalist strategy is to link the existence of three-dimensional space to three-
dimensional branes (where strings are one-branes). For example: “If a three-brane is 
enormous, perhaps infinitely big, . . . [a] three-brane of this sort would fill the space we 
occupy. . . . Such ubiquity suggests that rather than think of the three-brane as an object 
that happens to be situated within our three spatial dimensions, we should envision it as 
the very substrate of space itself” (Greene 2011, 113-114).  
Thus far, we have defined background-independence as the denial of a fixed 
geometric structure for all models of a particular physical theory, but, drawing on the 
work of, e.g., Brown (2005, 140) and Brown and Pooley (2006, 71), Alexander Bird has 
argued that background independence might also incorporate the “action-reaction 
principle”. In the case of space, this principle stipulates that space must be able to act and 
be acted upon, a state of affairs that is manifest in the reciprocal influence between GR’s 
metric and stress-energy. This leads to the following definition of background 
independence (which Bird dubs “background-free”): “In a true theory, any structure 
appearing in the laws of that theory is subject to being affected by changes elsewhere” 
(Bird 2007, 165).  
A few observations are in order concerning this strategy. First, as disclosed in section 
2, space cannot act upon things for either Newton or Leibniz (a point also noted by 
Brown and Pooley 2006, 71), thus modern spatial ontologies based on the action-reaction 
principle cannot appeal to the traditional substantival/relational dichotomy for support. 
Nor does the action-reaction principle apply to the foundational entity in that period, 
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whether God (e.g., “space is eternal in duration and immutable in nature because it is the 
emanative effect of an eternal and immutable being”, Newton 2004, 26) or monads (since 
a monad is “a certain world of its own, having no connections of dependency except with 
God”, AG 199). Rather, it is only corporeal substance (matter) and finite immaterial 
substances (souls/angels) that fit the criterion of the action-reaction principle in the 
seventeenth century. Second, if the action-reaction principle is, in fact, used as the basis 
of a new conception of spatial ontology, then it also marks a departure from the 
platonism/nominalism distinction, since platonism and nominalism only pertain to the 
existence/non-existence of mathematical structures in the absence of matter; i.e., causal 
powers are excluded. As put forward in this essay, the trivial substantivalism/relationism 
dichotomy is simply the modern equivalent of the platonism/nominalism divide as 
regards physical geometry, hence the action-reaction principle can be seen as an attempt 
to put space within the category of physical entities, and not physical geometry. Yet, this 
strategy raises troubling questions as regards the extent of the background structures that 
are, so to speak, “physicalized”. All of the existing QG hypotheses would seem to accept 
some form of background structure, whether geometrical, topological, causal, etc., that is 
not subject to action-reaction, so there is little justification within the search for QG for 
this interpretation of background independence for all such fixed structures. Moreover, 
since Bird declares that “any structure appearing in the laws of that theory” must be 
subject to being affected, does this imply that the laws of arithmetic or logic must be 
subject to the action-reaction principle as well? Since arithmetic is definitely a structure 
that appears in all QG theories, it must therefore partake in action-reaction affects. And, 
if not, then why is the mathematical field of geometry subject to that principle and not the 
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mathematical field of arithmetic? Essentially, the advocates of the action-reaction 
principle, in their quest to overcome the strictures of the substantival/relational 
dichotomy, have only succeeded in revealing the deep metaphysical mysteries associated 
with the platonist/nominalist question for all physical theories, in particular, the bias that 
exempts all mathematical structures from the action-reaction principle save the geometric 
structures (see, Slowik 2005, for a more general discussion of this topic).  
Lastly, it should be noted that Smolin’s quest for a completely background 
independent QG theory provides a unique Leibnizian twist to the action-reaction 
principle explored above. In response to the query, “Can there be a fully background-
independent approach to quantum theory?”, he states, “I believe that the answer is only if 
we are willing to go beyond quantum theory, to a hidden variables theory” (Smolin 2006, 
232). In more detail, he argues: 
We know from the experimental disproof of the Bell inequalities that any viable 
hidden variables theory must be non-local. This suggests the possibility that the hidden 
variables are relational. That is, rather than giving a more detailed description of the state 
of an electron, relative to a background, the hidden variables may give a description of 
relations between that electron and the others in the universe (Smolin 2006, 232)  
 
While the details need not concern us, Smolin’s hidden variables version of a fully 
background independent QG theory evokes the holistic, pre-established harmony of 
Leibniz’ monadic metaphysics. Although “the monad’s natural changes come from an 
internal principle, since no external cause can influence it internally” (AG 214), their 
pre-established harmony mimics the holistic interconnections that Smolin seeks: “This 
interconnection or accommodation of all created things to each other, and each to all the 
others, brings it about that each simple substance [monad] has relations that express all 
the others, and consequently, that each simple substance is a perpetual, living mirror of 
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the universe” (AG 220). Smolin describes his hidden variables strategy as “relational”; 
but the relational aspect of these entities, whether a monad or a QG hidden variables 
electron, is not spatial relationism, but the non-spatial interrelatedness of intrinsic 
metaphysical (monad) or physical (electron) properties—and this demonstrates, once 
again, the inability of the traditional substantival/relational distinction to probe the 
conceptual depths of the QG, and monadic, realms. 
 
6. Conclusion.  
One of the goals of this essay has been to demonstrate that the 
substantivalist/relationist debate has long since outlived its usefulness in assessing the 
ontology of spacetime theories. The evidence for this allegation resides in the ambiguity 
and uncertainty that characterizes any application of the distinction, whether in the 
seventeenth century or in the modern context of QG, as well as GR. In its place, a 
different set of distinctions has been offered that concern (i) the different levels of spatial 
geometry at the macro and foundational levels, and (ii) the platonist/nominalist divide in 
spatial geometry—and these new dichotomies, which more accurately track the content 
of both seventeenth century and modern QG theories, do not naturally align with the 
substantival/relational distinction, as we have seen. Consider substantivalism: with 
respect to (i), some alleged substantivalists embrace a similarity of geometric structure at 
the bodily and foundational level (More, Newton), but some do not (Gassendi); as 
regards (ii), some alleged substantivalists favor platonism (More, Newton, Gassendi), but 
some do not (Barrow). And, while both of the alleged relationists in our investigation 
(Descartes, Leibniz) side with the same camp concerning (i) and (ii), i.e., both posit a 
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difference in geometry at foundational and bodily level, as well as accept geometric 
nominalism, they do so for reasons that the standard substantival/relational distinction is 
seemingly powerless to explain. Furthermore, if the possibility of a vacuum were invoked 
as a means of separating substantivalists from relationists, and thereby, Newton from 
Descartes, then Leibniz would now count a substantivalist since he admits that a vacuum 
is possible. Hence, despite the obvious similarities between Descartes and Leibniz (and 
leaving aside relational motion), the substantivalist/relationist dichotomy simply cannot 
pair them together in a natural way, and this demonstrates, once again, that it is far too 
crude and erratic an instrument to assess spatial ontologies.  
In this essay, a more accurate set of dichotomies on the deep ontology of space has 
been offered that does accomplish a number of important goals. First, it successfully 
groups together seventeenth century spatial ontologies that are indeed similar on specific 
issues, but it also accounts for their differences concerning other issues: specifically, 
Newton and More, but not Gassendi, with FGL(met); Newton, More and Gassendi with 
ML(plt), Leibniz and Descartes with FGL(prg); Leibniz, Descartes, and Barrow with 
ML(nom). Second, our two-part dichotomy not only successfully partitions the various 
QG approaches into natural categories, but, more importantly, it also provides a basis for 
drawing successful analogies with seventeenth century theories, e.g., Leibniz with the 
pregeometry of QCH, and Gassendi with the continuous topological structure required for 
LQG. Moreover, it offers a consistent explanation for why Leibniz’ nominalism does not 
support the shift scenarios, whereas Oresme’s nominalism does, since the former holds 
FGL(prg), while the latter accepts FGL(top). Ironically, our system also successfully 
accomplishes some of the goals that have eluded previous assessments that rely upon the 
 51 
substantival/relational dichotomy to draw historical analogies: it links Newton, but not 
Descartes, with geometrodynamics, and Leibniz and Descartes with a pregeometric 
subvenient entity which lacks any continuous degrees of freedom.  
To summarize, with the attention of philosophers of physics now focused on the deep 
ontology of space, the inadequacies of the substantival/relational dichotomy have become 
all too apparent. While that distinction is somewhat serviceable in the context of 
Newtonian mechanics, it has become practically dysfunctional in the debates on the 
status of the metric-field in GR and, especially, in the assessment of QG hypotheses. The 
deep ontology of space, which is a paramount concern for seventeenth century thinkers 
and QG theorists alike (but not necessarily Newtonian mechanists), may now hopefully 
prompt a much needed recalibration of the tools used for ontological appraisal by 
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1 A nice overview is Belot (2000). As for examples, see, e.g., Hoefer (1996) for metric-
field substantivalism; Rovelli (1997) for metric-field relationism; and Dorato for a 
structural realist (2000) reading that is similar, in an ontological sense, to metric-field 
relationism. The “out-moded” nature of the dichotomy, as regards classical gravitational 
theories, is defended in Rynasiewicz (1996). 
 
2 That is, one should not construe Leibniz’ use of “expression” as indicating a purely 
phenomenalist interpretation of the corporeal world, and hence space; e.g., Furth (1967). 
As used in this context, a purely phenomenalist interpretation is equivalent to idealism, 
and idealism is the immaterialist hypothesis that limits ontology to just idea/perceptions, 
minds/souls, and a non-material God. 
 
3 A more famous endorsement of a property-like (or subject-accident) interpretation of 
spatial relationships is provided in the Leibniz-Clarke correspondence: “I shall adduce 
another example to show how the mind uses, on occasion of accidents which are in 
subjects, to fancy to itself something answerable to those accidents out of the subjects. 
The ratio or proportion between two lines L and M may be conceived three several ways: 
as a ratio of the greater L to the lesser M; as a ratio of the lesser M to the greater L; and 
lastly as something abstracted from both, that is, as the ratio between L and M without 
considering which is the antecedent or which is the consequent, which is the subject and 
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which is the object. . . . In the first way of considering them, L the greater, in the second, 
M the lesser, is the subject of that accident which philosophers call relation. But which of 
them will be subject in the third way of considering them? It cannot be said that both of 
them, L and M together, are the subject of such an accident; for if so, we should have an 
accident in two subjects, with one leg in one and the other in the other, which is contrary 
to the notion of accidents. Therefore we must say that this relation, in this third way of 
considering it, is indeed out of the subjects; but being neither a substance nor an accident, 
it must be a mere ideal thing, the consideration of which is nevertheless useful” (L.V.47).  
In short, according to his first two interpretations, Leibniz views relations as internal 
accidents of either subject L or M, such that the relation is somehow between the two 
subjects. The third way of examining the relationship, on the other hand, is simply an 
idealization of the first two, and, importantly, it is not advanced as contradicting, or a 
more accurate interpretation of, the other two “internalist” ways of considering the 
relation.  
 
4 One of the often overlooked lessons of Grant (1981) is God’s ubiquitous role as the 
ontological foundation of space for nearly all natural philosophers from roughly the early 
middle ages up to at least the beginning of the eighteenth century. With the demise of this 
theological basis, extension then found its “support” in such doctrines as Wolffian 
monads, Boscovichian forces, the electromagnetic aether, and ultimately, the 
gravitational field in GR.  
 
5 An additional impediment for any meaningful comparison between seventeenth century 
and modern spatiotemporal theories is their drastically different conceptions of geometry. 
Modern differential geometry, with its many component geometric structures (manifold, 
affine, metric, etc.), is utterly foreign to the classical, Euclidean conception shared by 
both Newton and Leibniz, where each component geometrical structure is regarded as a 
limit or boundary of the next higher dimensional component: e.g., “space can be 
distinguished into parts whose common boundaries we usually call surfaces; and these 
surfaces can be distinguished in all directions into parts whose common boundaries we 
usually call lines; and again these lines can be distinguished in all directions into parts 
which we call points” (Newton 2004, 22). Likewise, Leibniz often asserts that points 
“strictly speaking, are extremities of extension, and not in any way, the constitutive parts 
of things; geometry shows this sufficiently” (AG 228). On this form of geometric 
“holism” (or monism), so to speak, the kind of isomorphic mappings that generate the 
modern “hole” arguments are simply inapplicable, since points cannot be separated from 
the larger geometric structures if they are mere boundaries: i.e., there is no point 
manifold, M, and thus no diffeomorphisms, (h)g = g*, that can generate the 
(observationally indistinguishable) models 
€ 
M,g∗,T*  from 
€ 
M,g,T  that plague the 
modern manifold substantivalist (see, Earman 1989, chap. 9). Put simply, the 
independence of the various geometric structures in modern differential geometry 
generates the familiar underdetermination worries, such as the hole argument. See, 
Slowik 2010, for more on this topic. 
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6 For example, in the context of assessing Euclid’s axiomatic geometry, and the fact that 
our senses seem to conflict with its geometric conclusions, Leibniz comments that “what 
I value most in geometry, considered as a contemplative study, [is] its letting us glimpse 
the true source of eternal truths and of the way in which we can come to grasp their 
necessity, which is something that the confused ideas of sensory images can never 
distinctly reveal” (NE:IV.xii.6).  
 
7 As Grant recounts, the use of circumscriptive and definitive ubeity to signify the 
manner by which, on the one hand, bodies, and on the other, souls and angels, relate to 
space was common in the Scholastic period (1981, 130). Likewise, in exploring Peter 
Lombard’s use of these distinctions, Grant describes circumscriptive ubeity as the view 
that the entity “fully occupies and fills its place” and is “fully delimited and 
circumscribed by the termini of that place”, whereas definitive ubeity is the view that the 
entity “is delimited and defined locally only by the terminus of a place . . . but does not 
occupy its place as a dimensional [i.e., extended] entity” (1981, 342 n.66). Although 
slightly different in emphasis, Grant’s analysis upholds the fact that circumscriptive and 
definitive ubeity correlate, respectively, with the metrical and topological components of 
space, since an entity’s non-dimensional “occupation” of place/space entails that it is 
only the (non-dimensional) points of place/space that can be ascribed to that entity (and 
not a dimensional length).   
 
8 Some commentators (e.g., Pasnau 2011, 338, n.21) have tried to defend holenmerism as 
Newton’s preferred ontology of space, but this is quite dubious given the paltry evidence 
for holenmerism and the quite powerful evidence in favor of God’s actual extension (for 
anti-holenmerist interpretations of Newton, see Grant 1981, 253; Slowik 2008; McGuire 
and Slowik 2011). More’s anti-holenmerist strategy is to claim that both God and space 
are “simple”, i.e., not actually divisible, but merely conceptually divisible (More 1995, 
58), a position that Newton defends in De grav: “lest anyone should for this reason 
imagine God to be like a body, extended and made of divisible parts, it should be known 
that spaces themselves are not actually divisible . . .” (Newton 2004, 26). Elsewhere, in a 
work from the 1690s, Newton makes similar claims about both God and space: “[t]he 
most perfect idea of God is that he be one substance, simple, indivisible . . .” (Newton 
1978, 123), and, “space itself has no parts which can be separated from one another, . . . . 
For it is a single being, most simple, and most perfect in its kind” (Newton 1978, 117). 
Hence, God and space are both extended in the same way, FGL(met), which is 
contradicted by holenmerism.  
 
9 On the continuity of Gassendian space, see LoLordo (2007, 119-124). As Holden 
observes (2004, 105), Walter Charleton, the great champion of Gassendi’s natural 
philosophy in England, departs from Gassendi on this issue, for Charleton argues for a 
discrete minimal structure for both bodies and space, whereas Gassendi held only an 
atomic minima, or least part, for matter. 
 
10 Edward Grant claims that, for Gassendi, space is “coeternal with and independent of 
God” (1981, 212), which seems to imply that space could exist in the absence of God. 
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But, any such suggestion is utterly refuted in the passage quoted above, which employs 
the seventeenth century’s internal/external attribute dichotomy: “That God be in space is 
thought to be a characteristic external to His essence, but not with respect to His 
immensity, the conception of which necessarily involves the conception of space” (1976, 
94). So, given this internal/external dichotomy, by denying that space is external to God’s 
immensity, it follows that space is “internal” to God’s immensity (where a philosophical 
tract that employs this distinction can be found in, e.g., Magirus 1642). Accordingly, it is 
quite implausible to infer that space retains any real independence from God, especially 
given the further claim that God “necessarily exists in all time and in every place” (1976, 
94). Additionally, Gassendi holds that both space and God are infinite and immobile 
(1976, 91-95), which is also indicative of the close interdependence between God and 
space (once again, cf. Newton’s De grav). 
 
11 One of the most straightforward declarations of nominalism can be found in the New 
Essays, where numbers and extension are compared: “[I]n conceiving several things at 
once one conceives something in addition to the number, namely the things numbered; 
and yet there are not two pluralities, one of them abstract (for the number) and the other 
concrete (for the things numbered). In the same way, there is no need to postulate two 
extensions, one abstract (for space) and the other concrete (for body)” (NE:II.iv.5). 
“Geometric nominalism”, as used in this essay, is the thesis that spatial geometry is not 
an abstract entity (or universal) over and above matter, but simply the “concrete” 
extended material body or field. “Geometric platonism”, on the other hand, does judge 
spatial geometry to be an abstract entity that can exist apart from matter. Accordingly, 
one could view our platonist/nominalist distinction as equivalent to trivial substantivalism 
and trivial relationism, although this obviously reverses the chronology of the 
development of spatial theories: in effect, trivial substantivalism and trivial relationism 
represent a somewhat garbled modern surrogate of the older platonism/nominalism 
dichotomy for space.      
 
12 As noted previously, relational motion is a separate subject that is beyond the scope of 
this investigation. Starting with Newton and Clarke, the inadequacies involved in basing 
Newtonian mechanics on relational motion became a chief factor in assessing the spatial 
ontologies of such alleged relationists as Descartes, Leibniz and their followers, in the 
eighteenth and subsequent centuries. Yet, this line of attack, besides being irrelevant to 
the ontology of space, entirely overlooks the theological component that underwrites the 
ontology of space in the seventeenth century—and, it is this neglected theological 
component that most closely matches the issues surrounding the contemporary search for 
QG. The deep metaphysical “entity” that underlies all spatial geometries in the 
seventeenth century is, accordingly, crucial for understanding the overall spatial ontology 
debate, including the relationship that QG bears with these earlier hypotheses (hence 
there is no subliminal theological message motivating this project, nor would the author 
welcome any such misguided attempts).    
 
13 In more detail, although a monad’s extended secondary matter would not arise if God 
prevented it, with secondary matter equating with bodily extension at the macrolevel, the 
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unextended primary matter would remain at the microlevel. See, Slowik 2011, on the 
primary/secondary, and primitive/derivative force, distinctions. 
 
14 In spite of these observations, Jean Buridan offered a different God-grounded, 
nominalist-inspired approach to the vacuum in the late Medieval period that hints at a 
peculiar form of background independence. If the terrestrial realm below the lunar sphere 
was transformed into a vacuum, Buridan concludes that, due to the absence of the 
dimensional quantity instantiated in matter, that vacuum would be without any 
measurable size. As Sylla notes, “[i]f so, then God could create many worlds there, even 
worlds much larger than what was destroyed. A body in motion inside the evacuated 
lunar sphere could move with high velocity for a long time and never get any closer to 
one side or further from the other” (2002, 262). While this scenario might more plausibly 
resemble an anti-realism as regards geometry in that void sphere (or even a multiply 
connected spaces?), another way to envision it is as a limited case of background 
independence, since many different geometric “truths” are admissible within that sphere 
given the same God-grounded ontology (i.e., different geometries compatible with the 
same theory).    
 
15 Oresme argues: “Thus, outside the heavens, then, is an empty incorporeal space quite 
different from any other plenum or corporeal space . . . . Now this space of which we are 
talking is infinite and indivisible, and is the immensity of God and God Himself” (1968, 
176; quoted in Grant 1981, 349, n.123). Also, “Now this space of which we are talking is 
infinite and indivisible, and is the immensity of God Himself” (1968, 177). 
 
16 Oresme claims: “Notwithstanding that He is everywhere, still is He absolutely 
indivisible and at the same time infinite… for the temporal duration of creatures is 
divisible in succession; their position, especially material bodies, is divisible in extension; 
and their power is divisible in any degree or intensity. But God’s [duration] is eternity, 
indivisible and without succession. . . . His position is immensity, indivisible and without 
extension” (1968, 721). 
 
17 “Pregeometry”, in the context of QG, does not necessarily mean non-geometrical, but 
simply non-GR; i.e., it is not the continuous, differential structure assumed in the 
standard constructions of GR that employ differential geometry; see, Hedrich (2009a, 14, 
n.31). See, also, Hedrich 2009b. 
 
18 Emergence is a notoriously difficult concept, but our analysis will use this term to 
include both of the strategies explored in Butterfield and Isham (2001) for going beyond 
the standard ingredients of QM and GR, i.e., a four-dimensional manifold and a classical, 
Lorentzian metric: (i) quantization, which is the quantizing of a classical structure “and 
then to recover it as some sort of classical limit of the ensuing quantum theory”; and (ii) 
emergence, where the classical structure is seen as “an approximation, valid only in 
regimes where quantum gravity effects can be neglected, to some other [more 
fundamental] theory” (2001, 35).  
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19 In Cao’s history, the origins of “pregeometry” is correlated with Wheeler’s later 
development of quantum geometrodynamics, in particular, the difficulties associated with 
reconciling quantum fluctuations in geometrodynamics with a multiply connected space: 
“According to quantum geometrodynamics, there are quantum fluctuations at small 
distances in geometry, which lead to the concept of multiple connected space. . . . 
However, ‘quantum fluctuations’ as the underlying element of his geometrical picture of 
the universe paradoxically also undermined this picture. Quantum fluctuations entail 
change in connectivity. This is incompatible with the ideas of differential geometry, 
which presupposes the concept of a point neighborhood. With the failure of differential 
geometry, the geometrical picture of the universe also fails: it cannot provide anything 
more than a crude approximation to what goes on at the smallest distances. If geometry is 
not the ultimate foundation of physics, then there must exist an entity—Wheeler calls it 
‘pregeometry’—that is more primordial than either [differential] geometry or particles, 
and on the foundation of which both are built” (Cao 1997, 111). 
 
20 In more detail, Butterfield and Isham explain that “[i]n perturbative superstring 
theories, the target spacetime M is modeled using standard differential geometry, and 
there seems to be no room for any deviation from the classical view of spacetime. 
However, in so far as the dimension of M is greater than four, some type of ‘Kaluza-
Klein’ scenario is required in which the extra dimensions are sufficiently curled up to 
produce no perceivable effect in normal physics [e.g., GR], whose arena is four-
dimensional spacetime” (Butterfield and Isham 2001, 72). See, also, Rickles (2008, 311-
323). 
 
21 “[P]hysics makes use of principles from two mathematical sciences to which it is 
subordinated, geometry and dynamics. . . . Moreover, geometry itself, or the science of 
extension, is, in turn, subordinated to arithmetic, since, as I said above, there is repetition 
or multitude in extension; and dynamics is subordinated to metaphysics, which treats 
cause and effect” (G IV 400; AG 251-252).  
 
22 “The basic structure [at the micro-level] is a discrete, directed, locally finite, acyclic 
graph. To every vertex (i.e. elementary event) of the graph, a finite-dimensional Hilbert 
space (and a matrix algebra of operators working on this Hilbert space) is assigned. So, 
every vertex is a quantum system. Every (directed) line of the graph stands for a causal 
relation: a connection between two elementary events; formally it corresponds to a 
quantum channel, describing the quantum evolution from one Hilbert space to another. 
So, the graph structure becomes a network of flows of quantum information between 
elementary quantum events. Quantum Causal Histories are informational processing 
quantum systems; they are quantum computers” (Hedrich 2009a, 22). 
 
23 Leibniz apparently assigns a sort of derivative position to monads in space, but it is via 
the body which results from the monads: “[A]lthough monads are not extended, they 
nevertheless have a certain kind of situation in extension, that is, they have a certain 
ordered relation of coexistence with others, namely, through the machine which they 
control” (L 531). 
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24 It should also be added that many commentators are quite skeptical that Leibniz 
overthrows his preferred  monadic view of bodies and extension for this alternative 
conception based on the substantial chain; see, e.g., Rutherford 1995b, 162-163, and 
Hartz 2007, 107. 
